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THE “CURE” TO THE HOMEOWNER’S BANKRUPTCY 
BLUES: AN ANALYSIS OF A HOMEOWNER’S ABILITY TO 
CURE HIS MORTGAGE DEFAULT UNDER § 1322(B)(5) OF 
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE  
ABSTRACT 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is often defaulted homeowners’ only avenue to 
avoid foreclosure and remain in home. Debtors seeking to save their homes 
usually rely on § 1322(b)(5) which provides that a debtor may “cure” a 
default. Many mortgage lenders object to debtors’ plans proposing to cure the 
mortgage default on the grounds that the plan is modification of their rights, 
forbidden by § 1322(b)(2). The Bankruptcy Code neither defines “cure” nor 
“modification,” leaving it up to the courts to draw the line between what 
constitutes a permissible cure and a forbidden modification.  
The Circuit courts interpret the curative powers broadly: granting the 
debtor the ability to provide provisions in his plan that would restore him to 
his pre-default conditions. However, in a recent decision, the Fourth Circuit 
split from the other circuits’ interpretation. The Fourth Circuit narrowed the 
scope of the debtor’s curative powers to allow the debtor to only decelerate the 
mortgage debt and continue making his monthly mortgage payments. The 
Fourth Circuit erred in interpreting the curative provisions so narrowly. The 
court failed to thoroughly apply tools of statutory interpretation and address 
key points in its analysis.  
A correct and thorough interpretation of the statute supports a broad 
interpretation of the curative powers, unrestricted by the anti-modification 
provision in § 1322(b)(2). To avoid further error in the courts, Congress 
should amend the Code to include a provision that defines a cure as a debtor’s 
ability to nullify the consequences of default and restore the debtor to his pre-
default conditions. Subsequently, Congress should amend the anti-modification 
provision in § 1322(b)(2) to include that a cure of a default under paragraphs 
(3) and (5) of this subsection is not a modification of the creditor’s rights for 
purposes of this section.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Homeownership—the quintessential American Dream. Purchasing a home 
is not only regarded as a sound investment, but homeownership provides an 
individual with a strong sense of pride, personal attachment, and community. 
However, for many, the American Dream has become a daunting nightmare in 
the face of the possibility (or reality) of foreclosure. High unemployment rates, 
predatory lending practices by the mortgage companies, and other financial 
hardships have made it increasingly difficult for many homeowners to satisfy 
their mortgage terms.1 For instance, between 2007 and 2010, approximately 
two to three million Americans lost their homes in foreclosure. An additional 
two million homeowners were in default and facing the possibility of 
foreclosure.2  
Foreclosure is a detriment to all parties involved. Lenders must bear the 
burden of high transaction costs and legal fees associated with the foreclosure 
proceedings. The value of neighboring properties declines.3 Worst of all, the 
foreclosed homeowner must bear the monetary and emotional costs associated 
with displacement. Filing for chapter 13 bankruptcy is often a last resort for 
individuals seeking to avoid foreclosure, and possibly homelessness.4 
Approximately ninety-six percent of debtors that file chapter 13 are 
homeowners, and seventy-nine percent of chapter 13 plans provide for the 
payment of mortgage arrearages.5  
Chapter 13 bankruptcy helps a debtor save his home in three ways.6 First, 
chapter 13 stays foreclosure proceedings and allows a debtor to create a 
repayment plan to pay his arrearages.7 Second, the debtor may be able to 
 
 1 Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 33, 
34 (2010). The sub-prime mortgage crisis was characterized by a number of bad lending practices including 
mortgages with balloon payments for low-income individuals; extending loans to individuals with poor credit 
histories; and approving individuals for loan amounts that they simple could not afford to repay based on their 
debt-to-income ratios. R. Travis Santos, Comment, The Legal Way to Defeat Optimus Sub-Prime, 25 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 285 (2008).  
 2 White, supra note 1, at 34. 
 3 See Ken Kahan, Comment, Home Foreclosures under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 637 (1983); see also Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CT., http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
 4 Kahan, supra note 3, at 638. See also Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, supra, note 3. 
 5 In comparison, only about nine percent of plans provide for the payment of unsecured debt. White, 
supra note 1, at 34. 
 6 White, supra note 1, at 37. 
 7 Debtors must simultaneously make their current monthly payments as they become due during the 
life of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2012). This can be an incredibly difficult for the debtor who is 
experiencing financial hardship such as the loss of a job. White, supra note 1, at 37. 
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challenge excessive fees and penalties imposed by his home mortgage lender.8 
Third, the debtor may also be able to discharge some of his unsecured debt, 
allowing him to allocate more income to the payment of his home mortgage 
lender.9  
This Comment focuses on the first of the three ways that chapter 13 serves 
as a vehicle for the debtor to save his home: the plan. Section 1322 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (the Code) provides guidance on the contents of a chapter 13 
plan.10 Among the permissive provisions listed in § 1322(b), the Code provides 
that a debtor may cure any default.11 Most chapter 13 debtors rely on these 
provisions to save their homes. Debtors seeking relief from second mortgages 
or almost-matured first mortgages may rely on § 1322(b)(3).12 Most mortgage 
payments are spread out over twenty to thirty years, and will not have matured 
during the life of plan. Therefore, debtors seeking to save their homes 
predominately rely on § 1322(b)(5).13 The debtor’s ability to cure the default 
on his mortgage loan is not completely unchecked, however. Though a debtor 
may propose a plan that cures the mortgage default, § 1322(b)(2) prohibits a 
debtor from modifying the rights of his home mortgage lender.  
Many mortgage lenders have objected to provisions in debtors’ plans 
regarding their mortgage loans. The objection arises from a debtor attempting 
to cure the default and the creditor claiming that the debtor is, in fact, 
modifying their rights.14 The Code, however, neither defines the phrase “cure a 
default” in § 1322(b)(5), nor provides guidance on what “rights” § 1322(b)(2) 
prohibits a debtor from modifying.15 The lack of guidance from the Code has 
left it up to the courts to draw the line between what constitutes a permissible 
cure or a forbidden modification.16  
 
 8 White, supra note 1, at 38. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Section 1322(a) lists the provisions that all chapter 13 plans must contain. Section 1322(b) lists the 
permissive provisions that a chapter 13 plan may contain. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)–(b) (2012). 
 11 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3)–(5) (2012). 
 12 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1322.07 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
 13 Paragraph (5) is the focus of this Comment. However, the analysis is applicable to paragraph (3) as 
well. Id. at ¶ 1322.09. 
 14 See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982); Grubbs v. Houston First American Sav. Ass’n, 730 
F.2d 236, 238 (5th Cir. 2016); In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 1984); Anderson v. Hancock, 820 F.3d 
670, 671 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 15 E.g., In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871. 
 16 See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871; Anderson, 
820 F.3d at 671. 
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Most mortgages contain an acceleration clause.17 This clause provides that 
in the event of default, the mortgage lender has the right to declare the entire 
mortgage debt due.18 Though acceleration of debt is a common consequence of 
default, it is not the only consequence that a homeowner may face if he 
defaults on his home mortgage loan. Some mortgage instruments also contain a 
default interest clause.19 This clause requires that if the borrower fails to make 
his monthly mortgage payment per the terms of the mortgage instrument, the 
borrower must pay an increased interest rate for the remainder of the loan.20  
The courts generally agree that though the debtor’s promissory note may 
grant the creditor rights to accelerate the mortgage, decelerating the mortgage 
debt and allowing a debtor to continue making his monthly payments, is a 
permissible cure.21 In doing so, the circuits have defined the curative power 
broadly. Such a grant of curative power may allow a debtor to return to his pre-
default conditions.22 However, in April 2016, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the 
phrase, “cure the default” in § 1322(b)(5) more narrowly. The Fourth Circuit 
definition applies when the debtor’s default resulted in a higher interest rate in 
addition to the acceleration of his mortgage.23 The court did three things in its 
decision in Anderson v. Hancock. First, the court restricted the definition of 
“cure” to only allow the debtor to decelerate his mortgage debt that had been 
previously accelerated pursuant to the acceleration clause in the mortgage 
instrument.24 Next, the court held that when a debtor attempts to undo any 
other events triggered by default, it is a modification of the creditor’s rights 
forbidden by § 1322(b)(2).25 Ultimately, the court refused to confirm the 
debtor’s plan that allowed the debtor to continue making mortgage payments at 
pre-default interest rates.  
Consider the following illustration that demonstrates the distinction 
between the board and narrow interpretation of curative powers: Deborah 
Debtor purchases Blackacre. Her promissory note provides that if she fails to 
 
 17 Alex S. Moe, Against Accetturo and Beyond Bukowski: Litigating Notices in Illinois Foreclosures, 48 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 949, 958 
 18 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 51.08 (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 2017). 
 19 Mortgage and Note In Default: A Primer On Late Fees And Default Interest, GRAY ROBINSON 
http://www.gray-robinson.com/Elerts/100224_Mortgage_and_Note_in_Default.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 20 See Steven W. Bender, The Enforceability of Default Interest in Real Estate Mortgages, 43 REAL 
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 199. 
 21 See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871. 
 22 See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871. 
 23 Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See id. 
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make her monthly mortgage payment within thirty days from the due date she 
is in default. The promissory note goes on to state that if she defaults, the 
mortgage company may accelerate the debt and require her to pay her monthly 
mortgage payments in two installments per month rather than one.  
When applying the broad interpretation of the curative powers, Deborah 
Debtor would be able to create a repayment plan that provides for the 
repayment of her arrearages and a return to her pre-default conditions: 
unaccelerated debt and paying her monthly mortgage payment in one 
installment per month. However, under the narrow interpretation of a cure 
proffered by the Fourth Circuit in Anderson, Deborah Debtor would be able to 
create a plan that decelerates the debts and allows her to continue making 
payments on Blackacre. She would have to continue making those payments in 
two installments per month, rather than one. The Fourth Circuit’s narrow 
definition of a cure further handicaps the debtor’s attempts to remain in the 
debtor’s home and avoid foreclosure. The stakes are too high to leave it to 
chance that other circuits will adopt and apply this narrow definition to debtors 
seeking to save their homes.  
Congress should amend the Code to include a provision that defines a cure 
as a debtor’s ability to nullify the consequences of default and restore the 
debtor to his pre-default conditions. Additionally, Congress should amend the 
anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) to include that a cure of a default 
under paragraphs (3) and (5) of this subsection is not a modification of the 
creditor’s rights for purposes of this section.  
First, this Comment will provide a brief overview of chapter 13 bankruptcy 
and a history of the treatment of homeowners in chapter 13. It will then explore 
what “rights” the Supreme Court has held that § 1322(b)(2) exempts from 
modification. Next, this Comment will discuss how the circuits have 
interpreted “cure” as used in section § 1322(b)(5) and how the recent Fourth 
Circuit decision narrowed that interpretation. Finally, this Comment will 
critique the Fourth Circuit’s analysis employed to interpret the statute, and 
apply various intrinsic and extrinsic methods of statutory interpretation to 
support the broad interpretation of a “cure” and the amendment to the Code 
that this Comment proffers.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy  
Chapter 13 of the Code is titled “Adjustments of Debts of an Individual 
With Regular Income.”26 In order to qualify for relief under chapter 13, the 
debtor must either reside, be domiciled, or have property in the United States; 
the debtor must have regular income; and the debtor must have debts falling 
below certain statutory thresholds.27 Unlike chapter 7, the other chapter 
commonly used by individual debtors, chapter 13 allows the debtor to remain 
in possession of his assets and pay his creditors using his future income, rather 
than using the proceeds from the liquidation of his assets.28  
All debtors are required to file a plan, in which they proposes how to repay 
creditors over the duration of the bankruptcy.29 The debtor is given a great deal 
of discretion in developing his plan.30 Section 1322(a) lists only four 
mandatory provisions that the plan must include, while § 1322(b) lists ten 
permissive provisions, including among them a catchall provision stating that a 
plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with this 
title.”31 The presiding judge holds a confirmation hearing to determine whether 
the debtor’s proposed plan is feasible and if it meets the statutory requirements 
 
 26 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C., ch. 13. (title of chapter) (2012).  
 27 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at § 34.02. 
 28 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at § 34.01. Chapter 13 is similar to a reorganization for 
businesses available under chapter 11 of the Code. 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01. 
 29 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012); DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at §34.10. 
 30 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at §34.10. 
 31 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)–(b) (2012); DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 18, at § 34.10. The provisions 
required to be in every debtor’s plan are as follows:  
(a) The plan— 
(1) shall provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future 
income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution 
of the plan;  
(2) shall provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority 
under section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a claim agrees to a different treatment of such 
claim;  
(3) if the plan classifies claims, shall provide the same treatment for each claim within a class; 
and  
(4) notwithstanding any other provision of this section, may provide for less than full payment of 
all amounts owed for a claim entitled to priority under section 507(a)(1)(B) only if the plan 
provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income for a 5-year period beginning on the 
date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan. 
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2012).  
GLOVER_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 1:58 PM 
2017] HOMEOWNER’S BANKRUPTCY BLUES 95 
or otherwise violates another provision of the Code.32 The debtor’s creditors 
are also given an opportunity to object to provisions in the plan.33  
If the court confirms the plan, the debtor makes the payments in 
accordance with his plan to the trustee.34 The trustee then distributes the funds 
to the creditors.35 Sometimes, a change in the debtor’s circumstance may 
impede the debtor’s ability to continue making payments as outlined in his 
plan. In this event, the debtor may be permitted to modify his plan.36  
If a debtor fails to satisfy the obligations of his plan, the debtor may either 
convert his case to chapter 7 or seek a hardship discharge under § 1328(b).37 
The hardship discharge is available to a debtor if he fulfills three elements. 
First, the debtor must show that failure to make the plan payments is due to 
circumstances beyond his control and there must also be no fault on the part of 
the debtor. Second, the debtor must show that creditors have received at least 
what they would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 bankruptcy. Lastly, 
the debtor must show modification of the plan is impossible.38 For example, if 
the debtor gets seriously injured, and is unable to work and generate the 
income necessary to fund the plan, that may be grounds for a hardship 
discharge.39 If the debtor fails to satisfy the obligations of his plan and does not 
pursue one of these options, his case is usually dismissed.40  
If the debtor successfully satisfies the obligations of his repayment plan, 
however, the debtor receives a discharge under § 1328(a).41 This discharge 
frees the debtor from liability for all debts provided for by the plan or 
disallowed under § 502.42 Certain debts are not dischargeable, which 
unfortunately include long-term obligations such as a mortgage. For non-
dischargeable debts, the debtor must continue making payments on these 
obligations once the bankruptcy case is closed.43  
 
 32 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, supra, note 3. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2012); 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01. 
 38 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, supra, note 3. 
 39 Id. 
 40 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01. 
 41 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2012); 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.01. 
 42 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics, supra, note 3. 
 43 Other debts that are not dischargeable under § 1328(a) include “debts for alimony or child support, 
certain taxes, debts for most government funded or guaranteed educational loans or benefit overpayments, 
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Chapter 13 maximizes relief to the debtor by not requiring him to liquidate 
his assets and allowing him to create his own repayment plan with a 
tremendous amount of flexibility.44 Additionally, chapter 13 allows debtors to 
remain in far better credit standing than chapter 7 debtors because they are 
viewed as less of a risk by the credit industry.45 Further, chapter 13 “satisfies 
many debtors’ desire to avoid the stigma attached to straight bankruptcy and to 
retain the pride attendant on being able to meet one’s obligations.”46 In 
addition to benefiting the debtor chapter 13 also promotes creditor’s interests 
by allowing them to recover from future income of the debtor that would 
otherwise be unavailable to the creditors.47  
B. History of Chapter 13 Plans  
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 preceded what is known today 
as chapter 13 bankruptcy. Chapter XIII allowed debtors to make periodic 
payments to a trustee, under the protection of the bankruptcy court, that then 
distributed the funds to all the debtor’s creditors until his debts were paid.48 
Chapter XIII, however, was “seriously defective.”49 Congress recognized that 
chapter XIII plans disregarded their primary purpose of providing the debtor 
relief and a fresh start while maximizing recoveries for creditors.50  
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 sought to remedy the 
shortcomings of its predecessor.51 Congress recognized that allowing a debtor 
to create a plan tailored to his unique circumstances yielded the maximum 
 
debts arising from death or personal injury caused by driving while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, 
and debts for restitution or a criminal fine included in a sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime.” Id.  
 44 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.36. 
 45 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 118 (1977). 
 46 Id. 
 47 The general property of the estate provision of the Code excludes the wages of the debtor earned after 
the commencement of the case from coming in to the bankruptcy as property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(a)(2) (2012). Therefore, creditors generally would not be able to recover from the future earnings of the 
debtor. However, the chapter 13 property of the estate provision of the Code includes post-petition property 
and post-petition earnings as property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2012). See also 8 COLLIER, supra 
note 12, at ¶ 1300.36. 
 48 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 12 (1978). 
 49 Id. at 13. Some of the defects of Chapter XIII plans under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 included the 
exclusion of self-employed individuals; the deauthorization of spousal joint petitions; the requirement that 
unsecured creditors approve the plan; the duration of the plan was left unrestricted; the role of the trustee was 
not clearly defined; and discharge relief was arbitrarily withheld for at least three years from a debtor who was 
unable to complete his payments due to circumstances for which the debtor should not be held accountable. 8 
COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.36. 
 50 Id.  
 51 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13. 
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return to creditors while maximizing relief for the debtor.52 Congress enacted 
chapter 13 with the intention of encouraging a chapter 13 plan as the most 
effective means of improving debtor relief and creditor recoveries in 
bankruptcy for an individual.53 
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, chapter XIII plans did not provide an 
effective avenue for the debtor to keep his home. For example, a chapter XIII 
plan could not be confirmed unless the debtor’s mortgage lender and all other 
secured creditors consented to the plan. Also, chapter XIII plans could not 
include claims secured by interests in chattel or real property. One of the 
“innovation[s]” of chapter 13 under the new Code “was enabling the debtor to 
cure defaults on secured claims through the repayment of loan arrearages over 
time, even if the terms of the loan or non-bankruptcy law did not give the 
borrower this right.”54 By contrast, § 1322(b)(3) allows the debtor to include 
provisions in his repayment plan that will allow him to cure any default. 
Section 1322(b)(5) extends the curative powers granted in § 1322(b)(3) to 
claims on which the final payment will become due after the conclusion of the 
plan period. These provisions allow homeowners to avoid foreclosure and 
remain in their homes.  
C. How the Courts Interpret “Modify the Rights”  
The anti-modification provision provides that a chapter 13 plan may not 
“modify the rights” of a creditor secured by a lien on the debtor’s principal 
residence.55 The Code, however, does not define which rights of the creditor 
may not be modified.56  
In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2).57 The Court reasoned that since 
 
 52 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13. 
 53 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1300.02. Congress further demonstrated its preference for chapter 13 
bankruptcy for individual debtors in subsequent bankruptcy acts. In the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 Congress added a provision to the Code requiring that a chapter 7 debtor certify in his 
bankruptcy petition that he had been advised on the availability chapter 13. Congress also added a provision 
that in all consumer liquidation cases the debtor’s attorney must certify that he has advised the debtor of relief 
available under chapter 13 and the clerk must also give notice to the debtor of the availability of chapter 13 
relief. Id. at ¶ 1300.36. 
 54 John Eggum et al., Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1155 (2008). 
 55 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012).  
 56 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1322.06. 
 57 The Supreme Court interpreted the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) as it related to the 
treatment of an undersecured mortgage clam holder’s bifurcated claim under § 506 (a). The Supreme Court 
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the Code was silent as to the definition of “rights” it should be interpreted 
according to rights granted to creditors by state law.58 Therefore, the creditor’s 
rights are those contractual rights reflected in the mortgage instruments.59 
These rights include: 
the right to repayment of the principal in monthly installments 
over a fixed term at specified adjustable rates of interest, the right 
to retain the line until the debt is paid off, the right to accelerate 
the loan upon default and to proceed against [the debtor’s] 
residence by foreclosure and public sale, and the right to bring an 
action to recover any deficiency remaining after foreclosure.60  
The Court justified its reliance on state law to define what rights of home 
mortgage creditors may not be modified under § 1322(b)(2) by the fact that 
property interests are the creation of state law.61  
In the next paragraph, the Court acknowledged that the Code does impose 
some limits on the rights of home mortgage creditors in other provisions.62 The 
Court mentioned the automatic stay provision that limits the creditor’s power 
to enforce its rights to foreclosure on the debtor’s property in the event of 
default.63 The Court also mentioned the curative provision in § 1322(b)(5) as a 
“check” on the rights of the creditor.64  
D. How the Circuits Interpret “Cure a Default”—Circuit Split 
The Code provides that a chapter 13 debtor may include in his plans 
provisions that: 
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a 
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is 
the debtor’s principal residence, or of holders of unsecured 
claims, or leave unaffected the rights of any class of claims;  
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for 
the curing of any default within a reasonable time and 
 
emphasized § 1322(b)(2)’s focus on the rights of mortgage creditors, rather than the claims off the mortgage 
creditors. Nobelman v. American. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1993). Also, some parts of Nobelman 
have been superseded by statute because of the passage of § 1322(c)(2).  
 58 Id. at 329. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 330. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any 
unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is 
due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is 
due.65 
The circuits have analyzed whether certain provisions in debtors’ plans 
constituted a forbidden modification or a permissible cure.66 In their analysis, 
each circuit has attempted to fill the hole in the Code by defining what a “cure” 
is.67 The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have interpreted the debtor’s 
power to cure his default broadly.68 The Fourth Circuit split from the other 
circuits in Anderson, defining cure more narrowly.69  
1. Broad Interpretation of a Cure—Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits  
The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have had to resolve the tension 
between the curative and anti-modification provisions. In distinguishing 
between what constitutes a permissible cure and a forbidden modification, each 
of the courts has interpreted the debtor’s ability to cure his default broadly.  
a. Second Circuit  
In In re Taddeo, the Second Circuit considered whether a cure under 
§ 1322(b) of the Code allows a debtor to pay arrearages on a mortgage loan 
secured only by the debtor’s principal residence.70 The Taddeos defaulted, and 
per the acceleration clause in their mortgage, the Taddeos’ mortgage lender 
accelerated their mortgage debt and initiated foreclosure proceedings.71 The 
Taddeos then filed a chapter 13 petition.72 The Taddeos’ repayment plan 
proposed that they cure their default under § 1322(b)(5) by paying off their 
arrearages in installments of $100 per month over the life of the plan.73 The 
debtor’s lender objected, contending that this was a prohibited modification of 
its rights, in violation of § 1322(b)(2) of the Code.74 
 
 65 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2)–(5) (2012). 
 66 See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871; Anderson, 
820 F.3d at 671. 
 67 See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871; Anderson, 
820 F.3d at 671. 
 68 See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26; Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238; In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871. 
 69 See Anderson, 820 F.3d at 671. 
 70 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26. 
 71 Id. at 25.  
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 26. 
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The bankruptcy court held that the Taddeos’ plan to pay their arrearages 
and decelerate their mortgage debt was a permissible cure under 
§ 1322(b)(5).75 The bankruptcy court reasoned that despite the lender’s right to 
accelerate the mortgage debt under New York State law, the Code’s plain 
language and legislative history clearly indicate that “when [§ 1322(b)(2) and 
§ 1322(b)(5)] are juxtaposed, it is clear that the debtor is permitted to modify 
the rights of holders of claims secured by the debtor’s principal residence to 
the extent necessary to effect a cure of existing defaults.”76 The bankruptcy 
court’s holding was affirmed in the district court.77 The district court held that 
the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the curative and anti-modification 
provisions was in line with “the spirit” of chapter 13 bankruptcy: to rehabilitate 
the debtor while simultaneously protecting the interests of the debtor’s 
creditors.78  
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the debtor’s plan may provide for 
the paying of the arrearages on the mortgage to cure the default.79 The court 
interpreted the statute to conclude that curing a default means “returning the 
debtor to [its] pre-default conditions.”80 The court rejected the creditor’s 
argument that its rights as a creditor could not be modified in this way because 
of § 1322(b)(2).81 The court stated, “[w]e do not believe that the Legislature 
labored for five years over this controversial question only to remit consumer 
debtors—intended to be primary beneficiaries of the Code—to the harsher 
mercies of state law.”82  
The court also argued that a cure and a modification are separate and 
distinct things.83 The court rejected the idea that the power to cure is a subset 
of a modification, despite § 1322(b)(5)’s preface “notwithstanding paragraph 
(2) of this subsection . . . ,” because the legislative history and purpose did not 
support such an interpretation.84 The court went as far as saying that the 
“notwithstanding” clause was “unnecessary.”85 The court cited Congress’ 
 
 75 In re Taddeo, 9 B.R. 299, 306 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 76 Id. at 305. 
 77 In re Taddeo, 15 B.R. 273, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 78 Id. at 275. 
 79 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982).  
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 25.  
 82 Id. 
 83 The court however, did not interpret the phrase “modify the rights” in § 1322(b)(2), nor did the courts 
explain how a cure and modification are distinctly different. Id. at 27.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
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decision to structure § 1322(b) to designate the curative powers and anti-
modification provisions in separate paragraphs to support its conclusion as 
well as testimony by secured creditors in the legislative history in which 
secured creditors distinguished a modification from a cure.86   
b. Fifth Circuit  
In Grubbs v. Houston First American Sav. Association the court considered 
whether § 1322(b) of the Code allowed a debtor to include a provision in his 
plan to pay the mortgage arrearages, when the mortgage had been accelerated 
prior to the debtor filing his chapter 13 petition.87 The debtor took out a second 
mortgage on his home. Grubbs’ promissory note provided that upon default, 
the second mortgage lender could accelerate the loan, requiring payment in full 
of the remaining balance on the note.88 After defaulting, Houston First 
informed Grubbs that it had accelerated the loan and initiated foreclosure 
proceedings.89 Grubbs filed a chapter 13 petition, in which he filed a plan 
proposing to pay off the delinquent and matured amounts on his mortgage over 
the life of the plan.90 Houston First objected, contending that a loan secured by 
a lien on the debtor’s residence that had been accelerated and matured could 
not be reinstated under § 1322(b)(2).91 
The bankruptcy court held that the Grubbs’ proposal to pay off his 
mortgage arrearages over the life of the plan was a forbidden modification.92 
The bankruptcy court reasoned that § 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification provision 
prohibited debtors from curing their defaulted mortgage after the lender had 
exercised its rights to accelerate the mortgage debt and initiated foreclosure 
proceedings.93 Consequently, the bankruptcy court refused to confirm the 
debtor’s proposed repayment plan.94 The district court confirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s holding.95  
The Fifth Circuit overturned the bankruptcy court’s and the district court’s 
decisions. The court relied on an extensive analysis of the legislative history 
 
 86 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 28. 
 87 Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 237.  
 88 Id. at 237–38. 
 89 Id. at 238. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Grubbs v. Houston First American Sav. Ass’n, 718 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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and intent behind the enactment of § 1322(b) in its analysis.96 The Fifth Circuit 
adopted the Second Circuit’s interpretation of a “cure,” quoting the language in 
Taddeo quoted in the previous section.97 Similarly to the Second Circuit, the 
court also stated the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) should not be 
read to restrict the curative powers granted to debtors in § 1322(b).98 
c. Seventh Circuit  
In In re Clark the Seventh Circuit considered whether a debtor who filed a 
petition for bankruptcy under chapter 13 after a state court had entered a 
foreclosure judgment was entitled to cure a default under § 1322(b).99 The 
Clarks filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy before the sale of their property but after 
the court entered a judgment of foreclosure against them.100 The Clarks’ plan 
proposed to pay the mortgage arrearages over the life of the plan, in addition to 
their post-petition payments.101 The bank argued that approval of the Clarks’ 
plan to pay their arrearages was a prohibited modification of their rights as 
creditors under § 1322(b)(2).102 The Clarks asserted that the plan was 
permissible under the curative powers granted to debtors in § 1322(b)(5).103 
The bankruptcy court confirmed the Clarks’ plan, holding that the Clarks’ 
proposal to pay their arrearages over the life of the plan and reinstate their 
mortgage was a permissible cure under § 1322(b)(5).104 The bankruptcy court 
relied on the interpretation of the curative and anti-modification provisions in 
Taddeo.105 It also reasoned that § 1322(b) was analogous to § 1124(2) of the 
Code, which allows acceleration clauses to be nullified in chapter 11 corporate 
reorganizations.106 The district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s 
decision.107 The district court distinguished this case from Taddeo.108 Unlike in 
 
 96 Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238. 
 97 Id. at 241. 
 98 Id. at 246 (quoting In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982) (“the notwithstanding clause was 
added to emphasize that defaults in mortgages could be cured notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2))).  
 99 In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 870. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 870–71. 
 102 Id. at 871. 
 103 Id. at 872. 
 104 In re Clark, 32 B.R. 711, 712 (W.D. Wis. 1983). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 712–13. 
 107 Id. at 716. 
 108 Id. 
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Taddeo, the Clarks’ lender had already obtained a judgment of foreclosure 
against the debtors.109  
To determine whether the plan proposed by the Clarks was a permissible 
cure or a forbidden modification, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the phrase 
“cure the default.”110 The court interpreted the provision according to its plain 
meaning, stating: 
Ordinarily, the means by which one cures a default is by paying 
all amounts due and owing; however, “cure” is the end and not 
the means, and what the term refers to is the restoration of the 
way things were before the default. Thus, the plain meaning of 
“cure,” as used in § 1322(b)(2) and (5) is to remedy, rectify or 
restore matters to the status quo ante.111  
Based on this interpretation of a cure, the court reasoned that § 1322(b) allows 
a debtor to pay arrearages over the life of a plan to cure a default.112 The court 
also reasoned that the legislative history supported this interpretation of a 
cure.113  
The court acknowledged that “modify” and “cure” are not defined in the 
Code.114 However, the court stated that Congress clearly intended them to 
mean something different.115 The court supported this conclusion with a canon 
of statutory construction that the court should avoid an interpretation of a 
 
 109 The court analyzed the reasoning in Taddeo’s holding. The court then went on to explain why 
Taddeo’s analysis did not extend to the facts in Clark.  
In Taddeo, the court rested its holding on a number of factors: the legislative history that 
indicated the Congressional intent to allow debtors to cure defaults and repeal the contractual 
consequences; the many similar provisions in the Bankruptcy Code for the curing of defaults 
under § 1110(a)(2) (for example, a trustee may continue in possession of aircraft and ships by 
curing defaults and making payments in original lease or contract); the policy reasons for 
encouraging good faith negotiations among debtors in the Taddeo’s situation; fear of the threat 
that “the mortgagee will tip the balance irrevocably by accelerating,”; the concern that 
“[c]onditioning a debtor’s right to cure on its having filed a [c]hapter 13 petition prior to 
acceleration would prompt unseemly and wasteful races to the courthouse,”; and, finally, the 
conclusion that restricting debtors to cure only as provided under state law would leave them 
with fewer rights under the new Bankruptcy Code than they would have had under the old Act. 
None of these factors supports an expansion of the right to cure beyond the entry of judgment. 
Id. at 715. 
 110 In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 871. 
 111 Id. at 872.  
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 871. 
 115 Id. at 872. 
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statutory provision that would render another provision superfluous.116 Though 
the court stated that a modification and a cure are distinctly different from each 
other, the court did not explore what the distinctions were.117  
2. Narrow Interpretation—Fourth Circuit 
In Anderson v. Hancock the Fourth Circuit considered whether a cure 
under § 1322(b) of the Code allows a debtor to pay his mortgage arrearages 
post-acceleration and keep its pre-default interest rate.118 In Anderson, the 
debtors purchased a home financed by a loan of $255,000 at an interest rate 
of five percent over a span of thirty years.119 The promissory note provided 
that if the debtors defaulted the lender could accelerate the debt and initiate 
foreclosure proceedings.120 Alternatively, if the lender decided not to pursue 
those avenues, the debtors’ interest rate would increase to seven percent 
until the loan was paid in full.121 The applicable provision in the note 
provided:122 
In the event borrower has not paid their monthly obligation within 
30 days of the due date, then borrower shall be in default. Upon 
that occurrence, the borrower’s interest rate shall increase to 
Seven percent (7%) for the remaining term of the loan until paid 
in full . . . . 
As an alternative to an increase in interest rate upon default . . . 
lender may, in the lender’s sole discretion either 1) require 
borrower to pay immediately the full amount of principal which 
has not been paid and all their interest [the debtor] owe[s] on that 
amount . . . or 2) pursue any other rights available to lender under 
North Carolina Law.123  
After failing to make their mortgage payment within 30 days of it becoming 
due, the Andersons were notified that they were in default and that their new 
payments would reflect the default interest rate of seven percent.124 The 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Anderson, 820 F.3d at 671. 
 119 Id. at 672.  
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
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debtors failed to make their mortgage payments and, on August 30, 2013, the 
mortgage lender initiated foreclosure proceedings.125  
The Andersons filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition the following 
month.126 The plan proposed that they pay off the arrears over the life of the 
plan while making their post-petition monthly payments at a five percent 
interest rate: the pre-default interest rate.127 The Hancocks objected to the 
Andersons’ plan, arguing that post-petition payments should be made at the 
default interest rate of seven percent.128  
The bankruptcy court held that the Andersons’ proposed plan to continue 
making payments at their pre-default interest rate constituted a modification 
prohibited by § 1322(b)(2).129 Relying on Nobelman’s definition of what 
creditors’ rights are protected by § 1322(b)(2), the bankruptcy court reasoned 
that though a debtor can cure its default, it cannot do so “beyond the four 
corners of the document.”130 Since the Andersons’ mortgage instrument stated 
that upon default, their interest rate would increase, the Andersons’ repayment 
plan could not restore them to their pre-default interest rate.131 The district 
court confirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, but for different reasoning.132 
The district court argued that whether the Andersons could return to their pre-
default interest rate required a construction of the “maintenance of payments” 
language in § 1322(b)(2), rather than an interpretation of the term “cure.”133 
The court held that “maintenance of payments” means “making the same 
principal and interest payments in the note.”134 Consequently, the Andersons 
could not restore pre-default interest rate.135  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether restoring the debtors to 
their pre-default interest rate was either a permissible cure under § 1322(b)(5) 
or a prohibited modification under § 1322(b)(2) of the Code. 136 The court 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 In re Anderson, No. 13-05843-8-SWH, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3770, at *24 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 5, 
2014).  
 130 Id. at *21. 
 131 Id. at *23. 
 132 Jernigan v. Logan (In re Anderson), No. 5:14-CV-690-FL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49059, at *14 
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 2015). 
 133 In re Anderson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49059, at *11. 
 134 Id. (citing In re Martin, 444 B.R. 538, 544 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2011)). 
 135 Id. at *12. 
 136 Anderson, 820 F.3d at 673. 
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interpreted the anti-modification provision to prohibit a plan from altering the 
contractually agreed upon interest rate, including an interest rate following a 
default by the debtor.137 The court reasoned, primarily by relying on tools of 
statutory interpretation, that the power to cure a default granted in § 1322(b) 
“does not undo this protection of residential mortgage lender’s fundamental 
rights.”138 The court concluded that the phrase “cure a default” only gave a 
debtor the power to decelerate his debt and continue making payments on his 
loan to avoid foreclosure.139  
The Fourth Circuit rejected the debtor’s argument that based on a prior 
decision by the Fourth Circuit in Litton v. Wachovia, a cure of a default should 
restore a debtor to its pre-default conditions.140 In Litton the court stated “a 
‘cure’ merely reinstates a debt to its pre-default position, or it returns the 
debtor and creditor to their respective positions before the default”141 The court 
in Anderson rejected the debtor’s assertion that this return to pre-default 
conditions was nothing more than a deceleration of debt and maintenance of 
payments.142 The court rejected the debtor’s attempt to return to their pre-
default interest rate and ordered that the post-petition payments should reflect 
the default rate of interest provided in the note: seven percent.143  
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Widely used and accepted methods of statutory interpretation support a 
broad interpretation of “cure.” The statute’s text, legislative history, and policy 
considerations show that Congress intended that a debtor should be able to 
restore himself to his pre-default conditions, notwithstanding the anti-
modification provision in § 1322(b)(2). The statute shows the debtor’s ability 
to cure his default includes, but is not restricted to, simply decelerating his 
mortgage debt and continuing making payments. Thus, the Fourth Circuit erred 
in holding that the debtors’ plan to continue making payments at their pre-
default interest rate was a forbidden modification, rather than a permissible 
cure.  
 
 137 Id. at 675. 
 138 Id. at 674. 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id. at 675. 
 141 Litton v. Wachovia (In re Litton), 330 F.3d 636, 644 (4th Cir. 2003).  
 142 Anderson v. Hancock, 820 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 143 Anderson, 820 F.3d at 676. 
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A. Intrinsic Methods of Statutory Interpretation  
When a statute is ambiguous, tools of statutory interpretation can be 
employed to determine how the Legislature intended courts to interpret the 
statute.144 In employing these tools of statutory interpretation, the text of the 
statute itself is always the starting point.145  
1. Plain Meaning 
Absent evidence to the contrary, words in a statute should be interpreted in 
accordance with their plain meaning.146 Dictionaries are instructive on the 
plain meaning of operative words in a statute.147 In Clark, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that “cure” meant “to remedy, rectify, restore” based on the 
definition of cure found in Webster’s Third International Dictionary.148 Similar 
to the definition proffered by the Second Circuit, Merriam-Webster’s 
dictionary defines “cure” as “to deal with in a way that eliminates or rectifies” 
or “to free from something objectionable or harmful.”149 Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines cure in the context of maritime law, as the “restoration to 
health after disease or injury.”150 Though the context is different than the one 
at issue here, Black’s definition is consistent, in that a cure restores conditions 
to what they were before a particular occurrence.151  
In Taddeo the court described a default as “an event in the debtor-creditor 
relationship which triggers certain consequences.”152 The plain meaning of 
“cure” requires that the curative provisions in § 1322(b) be interpreted to allow 
a debtor to include provisions in his plan to restore him to his pre-default 
conditions.153 Most promissory notes provide that the creditor can accelerate 
the debt if the homeowner defaults.154 Though acceleration is the most 
common consequence when a homeowner fails to make his mortgage payment, 
it may not be the only consequence.155 Therefore, restoring the debtor to his 
 
 144 United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940) (“The meaning to be ascribed to an Act of the 
Legislature can only be derived from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction.”). 
 145 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681. 696–97 (1985).  
 146 In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 872.  
 147 See id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 CURE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cure (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 150 Cure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 151 See id. 
 152 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 26. 
 153 In re Clark, 738 F.2d at 872. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See id. 
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pre-bankruptcy conditions may require more than deceleration of his mortgage 
debt.156 For example, in Anderson, restoring the debtors to their pre-bankruptcy 
conditions required that they be allowed to make their post-petition payments 
at their pre-default interest rate in addition to mortgage deceleration.157  
2. Avoidance of Redundancy 
There is a presumption that Congress is not redundant when drafting and 
enacting statutes.158 Therefore, reviewers and courts should give effect to every 
word in the statute.159 The curative power provision in § 1322(b)(5) begins 
with the phrase “notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2) of this subsection.”160 To 
disregard this phrase goes against the presumption that Congress avoids 
redundancy.161 Congress included the “notwithstanding” clause to remedy the 
tension between the cure and modification provisions, demonstrating 
Congress’ recognition that a cure may, sometime, modify the creditors’ 
contractually agreed upon rights.162 The notwithstanding clause establishes that 
the scope of a cure is not restricted by the modification prohibition in 
§ 1322(b)(2).163 
3. Consistent Usage  
When words are used more than once in a statute, they should be 
interpreted to have the same meaning each time they are used.164 The broad 
interpretation of a cure is consistent with the way the term is used throughout 
the Code.  
Section 365 of the Code allows a trustee to assume executory contracts and 
unexpired leases.165 However, if the debtor has defaulted on the contract or 
lease, § 365(b)(1)(A) states that a trustee may not assume the contract or lease, 
unless at the time of assumption the debtor “cures, or provides adequate 
 
 156 Contra Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674. 
 157 See id. at 670. 
 158 See id. at 674 (citing Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“ . . . giving effect to each and every word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner 
than renders other provisions . . . inconsistent, meaningless, or superfluous.”)  
 159 Id. 
 160 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2012). 
 161 See Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674. 
 162 Cf. Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 246. 
 163 In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 28.  
 164 Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States EPA 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991).  
 165 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012).  
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assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such default.”166 Under 
§ 365(b)(1)(A), the debtor’s ability to cure is not restricted by the terms and 
period provided for in the contract.167 As such, the debtor’s curative power is 
broad.168 The result of the debtor curing the default on his lease or contract is 
that the contractual consequences of the default are repealed, consistent with 
the broad interpretation of a cure.169  
Chapter 11 of the Code also discusses the debtor’s ability to cure a 
default.170 Section 1124 of the Code outlines when a class of claims is not 
impaired and consequently is permitted to vote on a chapter 11 plan.171 Under 
§ 1124(1) the plan can leave a class of claims unimpaired by not altering the 
legal, equitable, and contractual rights of the creditor.172 Section 1124(2)(A) 
provides that: 
(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law 
that entitles the holder of such claim or interest to demand or 
receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest after the 
occurrence of a default— 
(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the 
commencement of the case under this title, other than a default of 
a kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of this title or of a kind that 
section 365(b)(2) expressly does not require to be cured;173 
The preface of paragraph two emphasizes the debtor’s power to cure despite 
the contractual rights of the creditor that would otherwise be enforceable under 
state law.174  
Despite the preface in § 1124(2), courts have rejected the idea that a cure 
under this provision only applies to debt that has been accelerated due to 
default.175 The Ninth Circuit stated that the natural reading of references to 
default in § 1123 and § 1124 is that “plans may cure all defaults without 
 
 166 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 167 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 365.06. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See id. 
 170 See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2012).  
 171 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1124.01. 
 172 Id. 
 173 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)(A) (2012). 
 174 David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Right of debtor to “de-acceleration” of residential mortgage 
indebtedness under Chapter 13 of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)), 67 A.L.R. FED. 217 
(1984).  
 175 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1124.04. 
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impairing the creditor’s claim, and that such defaults include, but are not 
limited to, those defaults resulting in acceleration.”176 The Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that the curative provision in § 1124(2)(A) allows a debtor to 
avoid all of the consequences of default, not just acceleration.177 Under 
§ 1124(2)(A), a cure returns the debtor and the creditor to their pre-default 
positions, consistent with the broad interpretation of a cure.178  
B. Extrinsic Methods of Statutory Interpretation  
1. Legislative History  
The Supreme Court has emphasized importance of the spirit of the law, in 
addition to the letter, when interpreting a statutory provision.179 A statute’s 
legislative history that “shows genesis and evolution” can provide insight on 
how Congress intended the courts to interpret the provision.180 The legislative 
history surrounding § 1322’s enactment supports a broad interpretation of a 
cure. 
a. The Drafting Process  
The Legislature created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States in 1970 to help develop the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.181 In 1973 
the Commission issued a report containing its findings and recommendations, 
and a draft of a bill to reflecting their findings and recommendations.182 The 
Commission’s version of § 1322 stated that a plan:  
 
 176 Id. (citing Great W. Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply (In re Entz-White Lumber & 
Supply), 850 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).  
 177 Great W. Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply (In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply), 850 
F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1988).  
 178 See 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 1124.04 (citing In re Centre Court Apartments, Ltd., 85 B.R. 651 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988)). In Centre Court the debtor’ promissory note stated that if the creditor had to seek 
payment of the debt by law or through an attorney the debtor must pay the creditor reasonable attorney’s fees 
and costs of collections. The court considered whether the creditor was entitled to these costs after the debtor 
cured the mortgage. The court held that the creditor was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the cure and 
reinstatement returned the parties to a point in time prior to the default and acceleration. 
 179 Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1901) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457 (1892) (“There are times when the mere letter of a statute does not control, and that a fair 
consideration of the surroundings may indicate that which is within the letter is not within the spirit, and 
therefore must be excluded from its scope.”)).  
 180 Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674.  
 181 Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238. 
 182 Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 238. 
GLOVER_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 1:58 PM 
2017] HOMEOWNER’S BANKRUPTCY BLUES 111 
(2) May include provisions dealing with claims secured by 
personal property severally, on any terms, and may provide for 
the curing of defaults within a reasonable time and otherwise alter 
or modify the rights of the holders of such claims. 
 
(4) May include provisions for the curing of defaults within a 
reasonable time while the case is pending on claims secured by a 
lien on the debtor’s residence and on unsecured claims or claims 
secured by personal property on which the last payment is due 
after completion by the debtor of all payments made under the 
plan.183  
In an explanatory note the Commission emphasized the powers granted to 
debtors under paragraph (4).184 The Commission stated that the provision 
allowed debtors to “keep current on long-term debt by provisions in the plan 
for curing defaults and maintaining payments.”185 In this report, the 
Commission highlighted the maintenance of payments and the debtor’s ability 
to cure his default as interrelated but separate things.186 
The Fourth Circuit in Anderson, insisted that the curative powers only 
allowed a debtor to continue making payment on what would have otherwise 
been matured debt.187 However, the Commission clearly did not intend for the 
curative powers to be restricted in this way. Otherwise, it would have been 
redundant for the Commission’s version of the provision and explanatory note 
to emphasize the debtor’s ability to cure and maintain his payments.  
As originally drafted by the House of Representatives, paragraphs (2) and 
(5) of § 1322 stated that a plan may:  
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims or of holders of 
unsecured claims; 
(5) provide for the curing or waiving of any default within a 
reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is 
pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the 
last payment is due after the date on which the final payment 
under the plan is due;188  
 
 183 BANKRUPTCY LAWS COMMISSION REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137, at 204 (1973) (emphasis added).  
 184 Id. at 205–06. 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id.  
 187 Anderson, 820 F.3d at 674. 
 188 A Bill to Establish a Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies, H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1322(b)(2), 
(5) (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 4, 1977). 
GLOVER_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 1:58 PM 
112 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
The Senate amended paragraph (2), prohibiting modifications of the rights of 
holders of claims secured by a mortgage of real property.189 Congress 
generally wanted to afford added protections from modifications to home 
mortgage lenders for the valuable service that they provide to society: making 
homeownership attainable.190 Consequently, paragraph (2) was amended once 
more to restrict the modification prohibition only to claims secured by a 
mortgage on real property that was the debtor’s principal residence.191  
Congress recognized that the modification prohibition in paragraph (2) and 
the debtor’s curative power granted in paragraph (5) were in tension with each 
other. In some circumstances, a cure of a default may require that a creditor’s 
rights be modified. Consequently, Congress amended paragraph (5) to include 
a provision that the curative powers remained intact “notwithstanding” the 
modification prohibition in paragraph (2).192 This “notwithstanding” clause 
emphasized Congress’ intention that the debtor’s ability to cure his default not 
be restricted by the modification prohibition of paragraph (2). Though 
Congress intended to afford some protection to mortgage lenders, it did not 
intend to do so at the expense of inhibiting the debtor’s ability to cure his 
default.193  
b. The Congressional Hearings  
During the initial phases of the drafting process of chapter 13, Congress 
heard testimony from individuals who represent some of the biggest secured 
creditors in the nation.194 The representatives did not advance concerns about 
the debtor’s ability to cure his default under the proposed bill.  
Walter Vaughn, Vice President of the American Security Bank and 
Chairman of both the American Bankers Association Task Force on 
Bankruptcy and the Consumer Bankers Association, presented his concerns on 
the Commission’s draft recommendations.195 One year prior to Walter 
Vaughn’s testimony, state and national banks had outstanding consumer loans 
 
 189 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 141. 
 190 See Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245. 
 191 95 H.R. CONG. REC. 11, 76 (September 28, 1978). 
 192 95 S. CONG. REC. 17, 423 (October 28, 1978); Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 246 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 193 Id. 
 194 See id. at 245. 
 195 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the 
Judiciary United States Senate, 94th Cong. 124 (1975) (statement of Walter Vaughn, Chairman, American 
Bankers Association & Consumer Bankers Association Task forces on Bankruptcy). 
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totaling approximately eighty-four billion dollars.196 The member banks of the 
organizations Vaughn represented accounted for a significant majority of that 
eighty-four billion dollars of outstanding loans.197  
Vaughn raised concerns about the portion of the Commission’s bill that 
allowed the rights of secured creditors to be modified and the debtor to cure his 
default.198 Though Vaughn had some concerns about secured creditors’ ability 
to protect their rights, Vaughn stated that he and the banks he represented 
supported the provision.199 The only amendment suggested by Vaughn dealt 
with the preservation of the value of the claims under the plan.200 He did not, 
however, raise concerns about the debtor’s ability to cure his default, so long 
as the value of the creditor’s claim was not impaired.  
Alvin Wiese, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Law 
Forum of the National Consumer Finance Association and attorney 
specializing in creditor’s rights and consumer bankruptcy, also presented on 
behalf of the interests of secured creditors.201 Mr. Weise was extremely critical 
of the Commission’s bill. Mr. Weise accused the Commission’s bill of being 
slighted in favor of the debtor.202 He stated 
The objective of the Commission is admirable but it must be 
legislatively balanced to insure the continued availability of home 
financing and consumer credit upon which our economy is, so 
dependent, and it must be structured so as to preserve and protect 
the rights of creditors to their collateral and against those who 
abuse the bankruptcy process through fraud, deception, or 
dishonesty. Further, it should be structured to encourage sound 
money management practices by consumers.203  
Mr. Weise believed that the Commission’s bill promoted bankruptcy and 
excused fraud, and he feared this would result in an increase in the amount of 
individuals filing for bankruptcy.204 He urged Congress against creating a 
bankruptcy regime that would result in the erosion of credit morality (which is 
 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 131.  
 198 Id. at 130. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 139 (1975) (statement of Alvin. O. Wiese, Chairman, Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Law 
Forum of the National Consumer Finance Association). 
 202 See id. at 140. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
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the presumption that the consumer is honest and intends to repay his debt, of 
which the creditor relies on in extending loans to consumers).205 He warned 
that the Commission’s bill, as written, would lead to a decline in the amount of 
home mortgage and other consumer loans creditors were willing to extend to 
individuals.206  
Despite Mr. Weise’s immense criticism of the bill, he did not raise any 
issues about the cure provisions that became § 1322(b)(5) of the Code.207 Even 
when questioned about his criticism of chapter 13 following his address to 
Congress, Mr. Weise never mentioned the curative provisions.208 
2. Public Policy  
The public policy behind the enactment of a statue, along with the policy 
implications of interpreting a statutory provision in a particular manner, also 
provides guidance on the meaning of a statutory provision.209 An 
understanding of the policy goals of a statutory provision sheds lights on its 
meaning because “[l]aws are not abstract propositions,” rather, “[t]hey are 
expressions of policy arising out of specific situations and addressed to the 
attainment of particular ends.”210  
a. The Goal of Bankruptcy: Relief to the Debtor  
One of the primary goals of bankruptcy is to provide a fresh start for the 
“honest but unfortunate” debtor.211 One leading bankruptcy scholar has said: 
Consumer bankruptcy has become part of America’s economic 
landscape. Once regarded as an unlikely legal alternative chosen 
by only a few desperate families, bankruptcy has become a refuge 
for one in every 96 American families by the time the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission filed its report.212  
 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 139. 
 207 See id. at 141–46. 
 208 See id. at 173–84. 
 209 73 AM. JUR. 2D STATUTES § 68 (2014).  
 210 BANKRUPTCY DESK GUIDE, § 1:5 (2016).  
 211 Anderson, 820 F.3d at 676.  
 212 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL, STEVE H. NICKLES & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, 
BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES 18 (4th ed. 2015).  
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A fresh start will give the debtor “a new opportunity in life, free from the 
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debts.213 There are several 
justifications for the fresh start policy.214  
First, the fresh start policy protects society from the honest but unfortunate 
debtor.215 An overwhelmed debtor with no avenue for relief may eventually 
lose his will to be productive at all, and society will have to bear the burden of 
the debtor’s unproductivity.216 The debtor’s unproductivity may result in an 
inability to support himself and his dependents.217 Society would then have to 
allocate resources to the support of the debtor.218 Additionally, the debtor may 
experience personal hardships, such as divorce or even suicide, because of his 
lack of relief from unmanageable debt.219 These things would also have a 
negative and costly effect on society.220 By providing the debtor with a fresh 
start, bankruptcy seeks to avoid these costs for society and restore the debtor to 
a state of productivity.221  
Second, the fresh start policy protects the honest but unfortunate debtor 
from himself.222 The fresh start policy recognizes that bad judgment is 
inevitable to the human condition.223 Consequently, a debtor may incur 
excessive debt as a result of overestimating his abilities to repay his debts or 
underestimating the risk of incurring the debt.224 Additionally, the fresh start 
policy protects the debtor who may lack the sophistication and knowledge 
necessary to make wise financial decisions, and to protect the debtor from 
predatory lending.225  
Third, the fresh start policy protects the creditor. Secondary to providing a 
fresh start for the debtor, the other goal of bankruptcy is to distribute the 
debtor’s assets equitably amongst his creditors.226 When a debtor experiences a 
 
 213 Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors Be 
Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans? 71 TUL. L. REV. 139, 174 (1996).  
 214 Id. 
 215 See id. 
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 226 BANKRUPTCY DESK GUIDE, § 1:5 (2016). 
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financial hardship, he more than likely has many creditors to which he owes a 
debt. Under state law, to collect on a defaulted debt, a creditor must obtain a 
judgement lien on property of the debtor and seize the property.227 Not only is 
this process time consuming and costly but by the time a creditor obtains the 
judgment, the property may be encumbered by another creditor’s lien, also 
seeking to collect on a defaulted debt. 228  
The narrow interpretation of a cure proffered by the Fourth Circuit in 
Anderson is inconsistent with the fresh start policy. By restricting the debtor’s 
curative power, the court denied the debtors the opportunity to have a fresh 
start. The court chose not to restore the debtor to its pre-bankruptcy conditions, 
robbing them of an opportunity to have a fresh start, contrary to the policy 
goals that the Code was enacted to advance.  
b. The Cost of Foreclosure  
Though about ninety-six percent of chapter 13 debtors are homeowners and 
seventy-nine percent of chapter 13 plans provide for payment of arrearages, 
only one percent of those debtors successful save their homes.229 The other 
debtors are left to the mercy of state law and their mortgage companies. The 
result is often foreclosure. However, researchers and policy-makers agree that 
foreclosure should be avoided whenever possible because of the high costs to 
all parties involved.230 Foreclosure is not only costly to the debtor, but it is also 
extremely costly for the mortgage lender and society.231  
Foreclosure is taxing on a borrower tangibly and intangibly. The borrower 
must bear the financing costs of relocating.232 Additionally, the borrower must 
bear the emotional burdens of being displaced: guilt, embarrassment, and 
sometime depression.233 Children may have to change schools or school 
districts, possibly mid-academic year.234 The borrower must deal with the loss 
 
 227 EPSTEIN, supra note 212, at 3–4.  
 228 Id. at 5. 
 229 White, supra note 1, at 37.  
 230 Eric S. Belsky, et al., In or out of Mortgage Trouble? A Study of Bankrupt Homeowners, 85 AM. 
BANKR. L. J. 291, 295 (2011).  
 231 White, supra note 1, at 34. 
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 233 Id. 
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of his ties to his neighborhood and his sense of community.235 In more extreme 
cases, the cost of foreclosure for the borrower is homelessness.236  
Foreclosure is also costly for the mortgage lender.237 Foreclosure imposes 
high transaction costs on the mortgage lender.238 During the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, between 2006 and the first quarter of 2007, twenty-three 
lenders filed for bankruptcy as a result of defaulting debtors in foreclosure and 
the associated transaction costs.239 Additionally, homes typically are resold at 
foreclosure auctions for much less than the actual value of the home.240  
Further, foreclosure’s effect on the housing industry has a domino effect on 
the insurance industry.241 A reduction in homeownership results in a reduction 
of the demand for homeowner’s insurance coverage.242 Moreover, foreclosure 
increases the rate of insurance fraud.243 For example, desperate homeowners 
sometime resort to arson to avoid foreclosure.244 Temporal pressures imposed 
by state law can often lead to settlements and big pay-outs by the insurance 
companies without a thorough investigation.245  
Society also suffers as a result of foreclosures.246 Foreclosed homes are 
often left unattended and unmaintained, making it an eyesore for the 
surrounding neighborhood and a magnet for illegal activity and squatters.247 
These blighted, foreclosed homes can drive down the property value of the 
homes surrounding it.248 A study showed that every foreclosed home reduced 
the property value of the other homes in the neighborhood by one percent.249 
 
 235 Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 33, 
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 239 R. Travis Santos, Comment, The Legal Way to Defeat Optimus Sub-Prime, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
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 240 Brandon Cornett, How to Buy a Foreclosure Home, HOME BUYING INST. (last visited Oct. 6, 2017), 
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Foreclosure also reduces the amount of property tax payments in a locality.250 
This is inimical to municipalities who rely on property taxes to fund things like 
education.251 Additionally, foreclosure forces down the price of homes, making 
it more difficult for homeowners to refinance their loans, and ultimately 
leading to more foreclosures.252  
The societal cost of foreclosure is best summarized as a no-win situation 
for everyone. Therefore, it is absurd to interpret § 1322(b) in a manner that 
would make foreclosure a more likely result for chapter 13. Restricting a 
debtor’s ability to cure his default to only deceleration of his debt makes a 
debtor’s small chances of saving his home even smaller, particularly when 
acceleration was not the only consequence of default. The broad interpretation 
of a cure is more consistent with the policy goal of avoiding the high costs of 
foreclosure to the borrower, creditor, and society.  
III. CRITICISM OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN ANDERSON 
The Fourth Circuit in Anderson, based its narrow interpretation of a cure 
on its analysis of the text of the statute, legislative history, and policy concerns. 
The court’s reasoning, however, was rooted in a failure to apply tools of 
statutory interpretation correctly and thoroughly.  
A. Anderson’s Textual Analysis of § 1322(b)(2) 
The Court in Anderson decided to interpret the text of § 1322(b)(2). In 
doing so, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the statute should be read “as a 
whole, giving effect to each and every word and making every effort not to 
interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions . . . inconsistent, 
meaningless, or superfluous.”253 The court reasoned that Congress did not 
intend for a cure to allow debtors to return to their pre-default interest rate 
because such a reading would “inexplicably make (b)(2) inoperative by means 
of a capacious power to cure written only a few sentences later.”254  
Respectfully, the Fourth Circuit was gravely incorrect. An interpretation of 
cure that would restore the debtors to their pre-default condition would not 
make the modification prohibition in § 1322(b)(2) inoperative. For example, 
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§ 1322(b)(2)’s protection for home mortgage lenders against cramdown would 
remain unscathed by the debtor’s curative power.255 Cramdown, the most 
common treatment of secured creditors in chapter 13 cases, allows a debtor to 
mimic foreclosure and give the secured creditor other property equal to the 
present value of the collateral.256 A debtor’s obligation to pay his secured 
creditor can be crammed down by property such as promissory notes and other 
obligations of the debtor.257 Cramdown also advances the fresh start for the 
debtor policy goal of bankruptcy at the expense of secured creditors.258 Section 
1322(b)(2)’s modification prohibition exempts home mortgage lenders from 
this type of disadvantageous treatment259  
Additionally, a debtor may only a cure a default. Any alteration in the 
contractually agreed upon obligations of the debtor proposed in the plan not for 
the sole purpose of returning the debtor to his pre-default conditions is 
forbidden by § 1322(b)(2). For example, a debtor cannot propose a plan that 
lowers his interest rate on his home mortgage loan simply because it is more 
desirable than his current interest rate. 260 
The Fourth Circuit was incorrect in its reasoning that a broad interpretation 
of the debtor’s curative powers would render § 1322(b)(2)’s modification 
prohibition inoperative. Restoring a debtor to his pre-default conditions does 
not interfere with § 1322(b)(2)’s safeguards afforded to home mortgage 
creditors from cramdown and modifications by debtors seeking mortgage 
terms more desirable than those that they originally negotiated with their 
lender.  
It is a principle of statutory interpretation that the same meaning is 
intended each time a term is used in a statute, unless the statute explicitly states 
otherwise. The Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of a cure in § 1322(b) 
would lead to inconsistencies if applied to other provisions in the Code that use 
the term. The narrow interpretation of a cure proffered in Anderson only 
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permits a debtor to decelerate his debt.261 This interpretation does not make 
sense in the context of § 365(b)(1)(A), since acceleration is not a consequence 
of default under executory contracts and leases. Congress would not intend 
“cure” to mean one thing in one part of the Code and something different in 
another part of the Code without expressly saying so.262  
B. Anderson’s Legislative History Analysis  
After performing a textual analysis, the court analyzed the legislative 
history to determine the intent of the legislature when it enacted § 1322(b)(2). 
The court in Anderson also justified it’s narrow interpretation of “cure” with 
the legislative history surrounding § 1322(b)’s enactment.263 However, the 
court did not actually cite any legislative history directly.264 Instead, it relied 
on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the legislative history in Grubbs.265 Grubbs’ 
analysis of the legislative history was framed around the question of whether 
allowing debtors to pay arrearages on previously accelerated debt was a 
permissible cure or forbidden modification.266 Therefore, the court in Anderson 
should have expounded on Grubbs’ analysis, focusing on what the history says 
about where Congress intended to draw the line when the consequences of 
default went beyond acceleration of the mortgage debt. 
The Fourth Circuit also quotes the language in Grubbs that during 
Congress’ meetings, home mortgage creditors’ “attacks concentrated upon 
provisions that permitted modification of a secured claim by reducing the 
amount of periodic installments due thereupon.”267 Congress’ response to the 
concerns of home mortgage creditors was not to limit the curative powers of 
the debtor in the way the Fourth Circuit claims.268 Rather, as discussed above, 
the Legislature responded by exempting home mortgage creditors from 
cramdown, which would have otherwise reduced the installment amounts that 
debtors were required to pay over the life of the plan from the value of the 
outstanding debt to the present value of the collateral.269  
 
 261 See 8 COLLIER, supra note 12, at ¶ 365.06. 
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C. Anderson’s Policy Analysis  
First, the Fourth Circuit also did a policy analysis of the narrow 
interpretation of cure that it proffered, focusing on the need to protect default 
interest rates.270 Subsequently, the court asserted that default interest rates 
benefit both creditors and consumers.271 In asserting the dual benefit of the 
default interest rates, the court acknowledged default interest rates as serving 
two important purposes for creditors: to compensate creditors for the time 
value of money and to compensate creditors for the risk associated with 
extending credit.272 However, the court warned that in the absence of the 
enforcement of default interest rates, creditors may issue loans with higher 
interest rates throughout the entire life of the plan or seek to foreclose on a 
defaulted debtor more quickly.273 Lastly, there was an argument provided by 
the court. The argument proffered that in order to incentivize secured creditors 
to make home mortgage loans available to consumers, Congress was 
compelled to legislate in a way that would assure lenders that their 
“expectations would not be frustrated.”274  
The court’s analysis completely failed to address the policy implications of 
its narrow interpretation on the primary purpose of bankruptcy: to provide a 
fresh start for the poor and unfortunate debtor.275 In its analysis, the court 
claims that the fresh start policy goal of bankruptcy does not justify a reading 
of the statute that “must perforce to be inimical to the welfare of mortgage 
debtors.”276 The argument offered by the court states that Congress intended a 
reading of the statute inimical to the welfare of the debtor. Another argument 
offered by the court is that to avoid decreasing “the attractiveness of home 
mortgages as investment opportunities,” Congress intended to draft a provision 
that would promote the interests of the creditor. However, even as the 
provision benefits creditors, it operates at the expense of the debtor.277 In 
aggregate, the aforementioned arguments are inconsistent with the primary 
goal of bankruptcy.278 
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The court’s policy analysis also aggrandizes default interest rates as a 
desirable alternative to foreclosure.279 On the contrary, for a defaulted debtor, 
higher interest rates further frustrate the debtor’s ability to save his home. If 
the debtor experiences a financial hardship and defaults on the lower interest 
rate, it is almost certain that he will be unable to make the mortgage payments 
with the higher rate of interest. The debtor will fall further and further behind, 
the mortgage creditor will proceed with foreclosure proceedings, and the 
amount required to reinstate the debtor’s mortgage will be higher because of 
the increased monthly mortgage payments, which reflect the higher interest 
rate.  
Anderson’s policy analysis also emphasizes the importance of allowing 
mortgage creditors to get exactly what they would have gotten outside of 
bankruptcy.280 If all creditors retained the same rights in bankruptcy as they did 
outside of bankruptcy, the Code “would have no provisions at all.”281 
Therefore, it is irrational that Congress intended the statute to be interpreted in 
a manner where creditors could expect to be treated as if the debtor had never 
filed a petition.  
Thus, Anderson’s policy analysis fails to adequately address the effect of 
its interpretation of a cure on the consumer debtor and his ability to obtain 
relief. Rather, its policy analysis focuses on the furtherance of the creditor’s 
interest to the detriment of the debtor.282 The court in Anderson failed to 
thoroughly analyze the policy surrounding its interpretation.283 Consequently, 
the Fourth Circuit restricted the curative powers to be far narrower in scope 
than Congress intended.  
D. Anderson’s Distinctions Between a “Cure” and a “Modification”  
Following the court’s analysis of the legislative history, the court attempted 
to make distinctions between a “cure” and a “modification” for purposes of 
understanding § 1322(b)(2). The Fourth Circuit cited Nobelman’s 
interpretation of the rights protected by the anti-modification provision in 
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§ 1322(b)(2).284 The court held that returning the debtors to their pre-default 
interest rate was a prohibited modification according to Nobelman, because 
doing so was a deviation from what was in the promissory note.285 The Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) prohibited 
debtors from altering the mortgage lender’s contractually agreed upon rights 
contained in the mortgage instrument.286  
Next, the Fourth Circuit went on in the opinion to contradict its own 
analysis of Nobelman. The debtor’s promissory note in Anderson not only 
provided that the creditor could increase the debtor’s interest rate upon default, 
but also granted the creditors rights to accelerate the debtor’s mortgage debt 
and commence foreclosure proceedings.287 The Fourth Circuit drew an 
arbitrary line between what contractual rights infringements of the creditor 
constitute a permissible cure and what infringements constitute a forbidden 
modification. Though the promissory note granted the creditor contractual 
rights to take either action against the defaulted debtor, the court held that a 
plan that provided for the deceleration of the mortgage debt constituted a cure, 
but a plan that provided for the restoration of the debtors to their pre-default 
interest rates constituted a forbidden modification.288  
The Fourth Circuit also failed to address all the relevant arguments made 
by the Court in Nobelman regarding what rights § 1322(b)(2) protects from 
modification in a chapter 13 repayment plan.289 The Fourth Circuit quoted 
Nobelman’s language stating that the protected rights are those that are 
“‘bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee and enforceable under 
state law.”290 In the subsequent paragraph, the Court in Nobelman stated: 
This is not to say, of course, that the contractual rights of a home 
mortgage lender are unaffected by the mortgagor’s [c]hapter 13 
bankruptcy. The lender’s power to enforce its rights—and, in 
particular, its right to foreclose on the property in the event of 
default—is checked by the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay 
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provision . . . . In addition, § 1322(b)(5) permits the debtor to cure 
prepetition defaults on a home mortgage by paying off arrearages 
over the life of the plan “notwithstanding” the exception in 
§ 1322(b)(2).291 
However, the Fourth Circuit in Anderson did not discuss this language in 
Nobelman, citing the automatic stay and curative provisions as permissible 
infringements on the creditor’s rights in its analysis.292  
CONCLUSION  
Filing chapter 13 bankruptcy is often a defaulted debtor’s only means of 
saving his home from foreclosure. Chapter 13 allows a homeowner debtor to 
construct a repayment plan that provides for the payment of his mortgage 
arrearages over the life of the plan, while maintaining the current payments as 
they become due. Debtors seeking to reinstate their defaulted mortgage rely on 
the power granted to them in § 1322(b)(3) and (5) of the Code to “cure” any 
defaults. This is best done by amending the anti-modification provision in 
§ 1322(b)(2) to include that a cure of a default under paragraphs (3) and (5) of 
this subsection is not a modification of the creditor’s rights for purposes of this 
section. 
Currently, the Code does not define “cure.” As a result of there being no 
clear definition of “cure,” it is left up to the courts to define the scope of 
curative powers. Until April 2016, before the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in 
Anderson, the circuits have interpreted the curative powers broadly, stating that 
a cure returns the debtor to the position that he was in prior to defaulting on his 
mortgage debt. In Anderson, however, the Fourth Circuit split from this 
interpretation, narrowing the scope of the curative powers to only decelerating 
the accelerated mortgage debt and allowing the defaulted debtor to continue 
making payments.  
In Anderson, the Fourth Circuit held that restoring the debtors to their pre-
default interest rate was a prohibited modification under § 1322(b)(2). The 
court arbitrarily drew a line between what constitutes a permissible cure under 
§ 1322(b) and what constitutes a forbidden modification. The Fourth Circuit 
attempted to justify its position with an interpretation of the text of the statute, 
the legislative history surrounding § 1322(b)’s enactment, the policy 
implications, and the Supreme Court’s guidance on what “rights” are protected 
 
 291 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 330. 
 292 See Anderson, 820 F. 3d at 673. 
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from modifications by § 1322(b)(2). However, the court failed to consider key 
points in its analysis to the detriment of the debtors.  
The text of the statute, the legislative history, and public policy support a 
broad interpretation of a cure, unrestricted by the anti-modification provision 
in § 1322(b)(2). The plain meaning of the word “cure” supports an 
interpretation that would restore the debtor to his pre-default conditions. Also, 
a reading of the statute that gives effect to every word in the statute scrutinized 
and selected by the legislature demonstrates that when the curative and anti-
modification provisions are in tension with each other, the anti-modification 
provision should not be read as a restriction on the debtor’s power to cure his 
default. This interpretation is also consistent with “cure” as it is used in other 
provisions of the Code. These interpretations of the text are supported by the 
series of amendments to the provisions during the legislative process, before it 
became law. 
A broad interpretation of the debtor’s curative powers is also supported by 
its associated policy implications. Bankruptcy’s goal is to provide a fresh start 
for the overburdened debtor while simultaneously providing ratable recoveries 
to creditors. Therefore, the Code should not be interpreted in a way that 
advances the interests of the creditor to the detriment of the debtor, 
discouraging debtors from using bankruptcy as a tool of debt relief and hurting 
both debtor and creditor. Further, chapter 13 repayment plans are often a 
debtor’s only avenue for saving his home from foreclosure. Foreclosure is 
detrimental to the individual, the creditor, as well as the community. Therefore, 
the Code should be interpreted in a way that would avoid this detriment while 
benefiting everyone.  
Congress should therefore amend the Code to include a provision that 
defines a cure as a debtor’s ability to nullify the consequences of default and 
restore the debtor to his pre-default conditions. Additionally, Congress should 
amend the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) to include that a cure of 
a default under paragraphs (3) and (5) of this subsection is not a modification 
of the creditor’s rights for purposes of this section.  
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